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ABSTRACT
This paper extends a game-theoretic model 
for identifying optimal defensive resource 
allocations to  the case of realistic  multi-
attribute terrorist objective functions. In 
particular,  we compare the  optimal 
defensive resource allocations to  ten major 
US urban areas in the face of uncertain 
terrorist preferences  with and without 
transportation-related attributes. The 
defender’s  uncertainty about terrorist 
preferences is  addressed both by probability 
distributions over the attacker’s attribute 
weights,  and by allowing for attributes  that 
are important to  the attacker but not known 
to  the defender.  Estimates of the various 
terrorist attribute weights are inferred from 
(partial) ordinal expert judgments using the 
technique of probabilistic inversion.
INTRODUCTION
Allocating  a  limited budget  to protect 
potential targets against terrorist  attackers is 
an  important  but  difficult  task.  In  doing  so, 
we must  take into account  both  the strategic 
nature of the attackers,  and also the 
defender’s uncertain  knowledge about 
attacker preferences. A variety  of game-
theoretic models in  the face of defender 
uncertainty have been studied and applied. 1
This study  is based on  the sequential  game 
with  incomplete information  developed by 
Bier  et al. 2 In that  model,  the defender  moves 
first  to allocate her  defensive resources 
among  the potential  targets under  uncertain 
knowledge about  attacker  preferences; the 
attacker  then  selects the target  with the 
highest  payoff to attack,  in  light  of any 
defensive investments.3  Knowing  or 
assuming  that the attacker  would play  his 
best response to any  given  defensive 
allocation,  the defender  wishes to choose her 
allocation so as to effectively  protect against 
attacks, deter  attacks,  or  deflect  attacks to 
less important  targets. However,  with 
uncertainty  about  the attacker’s utility 
function,  the defender  cannot  predict  the 
attacker’s best  response for  sure; therefore, 
the defender  is assumed to minimize her 
expected total loss (where the defender 
objectives may  in  general  be different  from 
the attacker objectives).
This paper  extends the above game-
theoretic model for  determining  optimal 
defensive resource allocations to the case of 
more realistic multi-attribute terrorist 
objective functions.  In particular,  we 
compare the optimal defensive  resource 
allocations in the face of uncertain  terrorist 
preferences with  and without transportation-
related attributes. The defender’s uncertainty 
about  terrorist preferences is represented 
both  by  probability  distributions over  the 
attacker’s attribute weights, and by  allowing 
for  attributes that  are important  to the 
attacker but not known to the defender. 
One closely  related task  is to elicit the 
attacker  attribute weights in  the terrorist 
multi-attribute objective from  the judgments 
of intelligence experts.  However, direct 
estimation  of attribute  weights can  be 
difficult, since intelligence analysts are 
usually  not  familiar  with  utility  theory,  and 
historical data  about  terrorist  attacks are 
relatively  sparse.  In  such  cases,  indirect 
elicitation  may  be preferable.  In  particular, 
this paper  uses an  approach  in  which  experts 
are asked to give (partial) rank orderings of 
attack  strategies or  targets, and the attribute 
weights in  the attacker  objective function  are 
then  inferred from  those partial rankings 
using  probabilistic inversion. 4  We believe 
that this approach  will increase the 
acceptance of quantitative methods by 
intelligence experts, and also make it  possible 
to elicit  the opinions of a  large number  of 
experts in  an  automated (e.g.,  online) 
manner. 
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MODEL
As in  Wang and Bier,5  we assume that  the 
defender’s objective is to minimize the total 
expected loss, as given by
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where:
• n = number of targets
• ci= defender’s resource allocation to 
target i
• B = defender’s total budget
• vi = defender’s valuation of target i
• hi(c1,...,cn)  = probability  of an  attack 
on target i
• p(ci)  = 
 
!!!!!  = = success probability  of 
an  attack  on target  i,  as a  function of 
the budget allocated to target i, where 
λ is the cost  effectiveness of defensive 
investment.6  
The attacker  is then  assumed to observe the 
defender’s resource allocations ci and then 
choose the target  with  the highest payoff in 
light of any defensive investment: 
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where:
• Ui = 
 
!!!!!!!!   
 
 uj(Aij)xj + eixm = 
attacker’s utility of target i
• xj= attacker  weight  on  attribute j(xj ≥ 
0, j=1, ... , m, and 
 




• Aij = attacker  rating  of target  i on 
attribute j(j=1, ... , m - 1)
• uj= single-attribute utility  function  for 
attribute , taking on values in [0, 1]. 
• εi = attacker  utility  of target i on  the 
unobserved attribute (modeled as 
independent,  identically  uniformly 
distributed random  variables taking 
on values in [0, 1]).
Experts are asked to give partial rank 
orderings of the various possible attacker 
targets or  strategies (e.g.,  the top five and 
bottom  five).   The probability  distributions of 
the various attribute weights  are then 
estimated using probabilistic inversion.7 
CASE STUDY
We conduct a  case study  on  the ten major  US 
urban  areas with  the highest expected 
damage from  terrorism, 8  based on  two 
different sets of attributes: “macro”  attributes 
(expected property  losses from  terrorism, and 
total population);9 and transportation-related 
attributes (yearly  air  departures,  and average 
daily  bridge traffic  on  the most heavily 
traveled bridge).10  The ten  urban areas are: 
New  York City  (NYC); Chicago; San 
Francisco; Washington,  DC; Los Angeles 
(LA); Philadelphia; Boston; Houston; 
Newark; and Seattle.  The attribute values for 
these ten urban areas are presented in  Table 
1. 
Urban Area
Expected Property Loss 
from Terrorism 
($ million)
Population Yearly Air Departures
Average Daily 
Bridge Traffic
 NYC 413 9,314,235 23,599 596,400
 Chicago 115 8,272,768 39,949 318,800
 San Francisco  57 1,731,183 19,142 277,700
 Washington, 
DC 36 4,923,153 17,253 254,975
 LA 34 9,519,338 28,816 336,000
 Philadelphia 21 5,100,931 13,640 192,204
Boston 18 3,406,829 11,625 669,000
 Houston  11 4,177,646 20,979 308,060
 Newark 7.3 2,032,989 12,827 518,100
 Seattle 6.7 2,414,616 13,578 212,000
Table 1. Attribute values for the ten urban areas with the highest expected terrorism losses.
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We consider  two hypothetical experts who 
give partial  rank  orderings of these urban 
areas.  In  particular, Expert 1  ranks NYC, 
Chicago,  LA,  San  Francisco, and DC as the 
top five most attractive cities (in  that  order), 
and Houston  at the bottom; Expert  2  ranks 
Chicago,  LA,  NYC, Houston, and Boston as 
the top five cities (in that order), and 
Philadelphia at the bottom.
For  this case study,  we assume that the 
attacker’s single-attribute utility  function  for 
attribute  j(j = 1, ...  ,  m  - 1),  uj(Akj) is 
proportional to ln
 
!!!"!! !  (where aj = miniAij), 
and hence measures how  much  more 
attractive target  k  is than  the least  desirable 
target  on attribute j.  They  are normalized so 
that  uj(Akj) = 1  when  target  k  is the most 
attractive target on  attribute j.  This choice of 
utility  function  is also consistent with 
Fechner’s law, which  states that human 
perceptions are  typically  logarithmic in  the 
magnitude of the original stimuli. 11  For 
example,  if the expected property  loss in 
Chicago is doubled from  115  to 230  million 
dollars, the attacker’s single-attribute utility 
increases by  an addit ive increment 
proportional to ln(2). 
The histograms in  Figure 1  show  the 
probability  distributions for  the attacker 
attribute weights inferred from  the rankings 
of expert 1, with  and without transportation-
related attributes.  Including transportation-
related attributes reduces the expected 
weight  on  the unobserved attribute from  31 
percent  to 24  percent. However,  the weight 
on  the unobserved attribute is sti l l 
substantial, reflecting  the fact that  the 
rankings given  by  Expert  1  do not  place a  lot 
of importance on  air  departures and bridge 
traffic. 
Figure 1. Attribute weights inferred from the rankings of Expert 1.
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The optimal defensive  resource allocations 
based on  the elicited attribute weights from 
Expert  1  are shown  in  Figure 2. Note that San 
Francisco is rated higher  than  DC both  by 
Expert  1,  and on  the defender  objective 
function (property  loss). However,  as shown 
in  Figure 2a, when  using only  the two macro 
attributes, DC  gets more resources than San 
Francisco, reflecting  the fact that the model 
does not have enough  information  to 
distinguish  clearly  between San  Francisco 
and DC. Including the transportation-related 
attributes allows the model  to perform  better 
in  this regard,  as shown by  the reversed 
ranking  of San  Francisco and DC in  Figure 
2b.
Figure 2. Optimal defensive allocations based on elicited attribute weights from Expert 1.
Figures 3  and 4  give comparable results 
for  hypothetical  Expert 2.  Figure 3a shows 
that  wi thout  t ransportat ion-re la ted 
attributes, the model  puts 40  percent  of the 
weight  on  the unobserved attribute, 
indicating that the macro attributes are not 
sufficient to adequately  represent  the beliefs 
of Expert 2.  By  contrast,  Figure 3b shows 
that the ratings given  by  Expert 2  are 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  a  h i g h  w e i g h t o n 
transportation-related attributes.   As a  result, 
the weight on the unobserved attribute drops 
to only 18 percent.
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Figure 3. Attribute weights inferred from the rankings of Expert 2.
Using  only  macro attributes also performs 
poorly  for  the optimal  defensive allocations 
resulting  from  the judgments of Expert 2, 
since the expert’s target rankings (Chicago, 
LA, NYC, Houston, and Boston  as the top five 
cities, and Philadelphia  at  the bottom) reflect 
high  weights on  transportation-related 
attributes.  For  example, Houston is ranked 
fourth  in  air  departures,  but receives only 
modest  funding  in  Figure 4a; by  contrast, 
Philadelphia  is ranked seventh  in  air 
departures and tenth in  bridge traffic,  but 
receives relatively  high  levels of funding  in 
Figure 4a, because of its large population. 
With  the inclusion  of transportation-related 
attributes, the model  does a  much  better  job 
of matching  the stated rankings given by 
Expert 2, as shown in Figure 4b.
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Figure 4. Optimal defensive allocations based on elicited attribute weights from Expert 2
CONCLUSION
Intelligence analysts are sometimes unable or 
unwilling to provide quantitative risk 
estimates.12  This paper  bridges this gap by 
providing a practical and methodologically 
credible way  for  risk analysts to obtain 
quantitative risk  estimates from  ordinal 
rankings provided by  intelligence analysts. In 
particular,  if experts find it  difficult to 
estimate attacker  attribute weights, indirect 
elicitation  based on  (partial)  rank  ordering  of 
attack  targets or  strategies can help ease  the 
elicitation burden.  We believe that this 
approach  will increase the acceptance of 
quantitative approaches by  intelligence 
experts,  and increase the number  of experts 
whose opinions can  be elicited in  an 
automated (e.g., online) manner. 
In  addition, the inclusion of unobserved 
attributes makes it possible to use our  model 
in  a  diagnostic manner,  to indicate  whether 
we have enough attributes.  Finally, the 
results presented here (based on  hypothetical 
expert  judgments)  show  that  including 
transportation-related attributes can  help to 
distinguish  between  targets,  especially  when 
an  expert believes that the attacker  puts high 
weight  on transportation-related attack 
strategies.
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